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INTRODUCTION 
What else can public corporations do for women and people of 
color?  What else can attorneys for women and people of color do 
to serve those clients better?  Many goals have been suggested 
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and advanced including (1) equal pay for equal work, (2) equal 
opportunity, (3) special consideration in light of history, biology, 
and special circumstances, (4) various forms of affirmative action, 
and (5) reparations for past wrongs, to mention a few.  Many of 
these have been advanced not only as moral or ethical 
propositions, but as “win-win” opportunities not only for women 
and people of color, but also for corporations and shareholders as 
well.  The italicized “else” in the two introductory questions set 
forth above seeks to identify additional opportunities rarely 
advanced or considered. 
One of the most important duties of lawyers is to assist 
clients in identifying and securing their essential rights, 
responsibilities, and opportunities.  One of the purposes of legal 
education is to assist lawyers, clients, and society in identifying 
and securing essential rights, responsibilities, and opportunities. 
In the light of this duty and purpose, this Article describes 
one opportunity rarely suggested by counsel that may offer to 
people of color, women, public corporations, and their 
shareholders benefits far beyond the conventional wisdom and 
far greater than can be expected based on the mainstream 
economic theories (classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian) 
generally relied upon in formulating and evaluating plans and 
opportunities. 
The opportunity is to secure for growing numbers, and 
eventually all women and people of color, the right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital.1  This is a right presently 
enjoyed by all well-capitalized people, which, of course, includes 
some women and people of color, but only a small minority of 
them. 
To understand why this right, which is called “the binary 
property right,” may be of singular importance to women and 
people of color, and also to essentially all poor and working 
people, and why its realization may also be in the interest of 
public corporations and most, if not all, of their shareholders, it is 
necessary for counsel for women and people of color to learn some 
 
1 As used in binary theory, capital refers to all non-human factors of production 
that can be owned. Thus it includes land, animals, tools, machines, structures, 
patents, copyrights, and other intangibles—anything capable of being owned and 
producing wealth and therefore income. Capital does not include what is sometimes 
called “financial capital,” which binary economics analyzes as a participation in the 
earnings of capital (i.e., a property right in capital). Furthermore, capital does not 
include “human capital,” which binary economics analyzes as a function of labor. 
CP1_ASHFORD 2/6/2006  9:10:03 PM 
2005] MEMO ON BINARY ECONOMICS 1223 
basic principles of a little-understood theory of economics called 
“binary economics.”  Binary economics offers a conception of 
economics that is foundationally distinct from the economic 
theories presently employed by government, private enterprise, 
charitable foundations, policy institutes, individuals, and their 
counsel to formulate and evaluate economic policy.2 
As explained more fully below, according to binary 
economics, instituting the binary property right is beneficial to 
women and people of color because it will over time greatly 
enhance their earning power and autonomy by supplementing 
their labor income and/or welfare benefits increasingly with their 
earnings from capital ownership.  Instituting the binary property 
right will also benefit public corporations and their shareholders 
because it will provide a stable, growing, broadening, production-
based consumer demand that will enable public corporations to 
 
2 Binary Economics was first advanced by the corporate finance attorney, 
investment banker, and philosopher, Louis Kelso. See generally LOUIS O. KELSO & 
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); LOUIS O. KELSO & 
PATRICIA H. KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP 
REVOLUTION (1986); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS: 
A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS (1961); 
LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF 
REALITY (1967). The authoritative and most complete source of writings by Louis 
Kelso can be found on the website of The Kelso Institute. The Kelso Institute, 
http://www.kelsoinstitute.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
 In recent years, binary economics has become a subject of inquiry within the 
socio-economic approach to law-related economic issues championed by the Section 
on Socio-Economics of the Association of American Law Schools at its Annual 
Meeting Programs. See The Journal of Law and Socio-Economics, 
http://www.journaloflawandsocioeconomics.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
 The author has published other works discussing binary economics as a distinct 
paradigm. See generally ROBERT ASHFORD & RODNEY SHAKESPEARE, BINARY 
ECONOMICS: THE NEW PARADIGM (1999); Robert Ashford, The Binary Economics of 
Louis Kelso: A Democratic Private Property System for Growth and Justice, in 
CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY 99–100 (John H. Miller ed., 
1994), available at http://www.cesj.org/binaryeconomics/binary-cwp1ed.pdf; Robert 
Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso: The Promise of Universal Capitalism, 
22 RUTGERS L.J. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Ashford, The Promise of Universal 
Capitalism]; Robert Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, 25 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 
1 (1996) [hereinafter Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy]; Robert Ashford, A 
New Market Paradigm for Sustainable Growth: Financing Broader Capital 
Ownership with Louis Kelso’s Binary Economics, 14 PRAXIS: FLETCHER J. DEV. 
STUD. 25 (1998); Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization 
and Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531 
(2002) [hereinafter Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility]. 
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employ their existing productive capacity more fully and 
profitably as well as invest more profitability to achieve greater 
growth. 
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, well-
capitalized people use:  (1) the pre-tax earnings of capital, (2) 
collateral, (3) credit, (4) insurance and markets to diversify and 
reduce risk, and (5) a monetary policy intended to protect private 
property.  The same institutions and practices that work 
profitably for well-capitalized people can also work profitably for 
all people.  Moreover, in an economy operating at less than full 
capacity, if capital can competitively pay for its acquisition costs 
out of its future earnings primarily for existing owners, it can do 
so even more profitably if all people are included in the capital 
acquisition process. 
Binary economic analysis combines the salient principles of 
the following:  (1) the Homestead Acts, which were intended to 
broaden land ownership, (2) the employee stock ownership plan 
(“ESOP”) technique of corporate finance, which uses tax exempt 
limited liability trusts, as fiduciary agents for employees, to 
acquire shares of employer stock with non-recourse credit, (3) a 
market for capital credit insurance, such as that profitably 
provided by the Federal Housing Administration, and (4) a 
return of the Federal Reserve to its original Congressional 
mandate under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to broaden 
access to capital credit by discounting of eligible productive 
private credit. 
Binary economic analysis offers an entirely voluntary means 
that would enable major prime credit-worthy companies to meet 
any portion of their capital requirements while simultaneously 
enabling their employees, customers, neighbors, and others to 
acquire shares in participating corporations with non-recourse 
credit, and pay for those shares with the earnings of the capital 
acquired.  The acquired shares would be full-dividend shares of 
the participating companies.  The shares would distribute their 
full return (net of reserves for depreciation, research, and 
development to maintain the competitive productive capacity of 
the capital) first to pay the cost of capital acquisition and then to 
provide a capital source of income to supplement wages and 
welfare benefits. 
When representing women and people of color regarding 
their economic interests, counsel should not limit the scope of 
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their representation to exclude advocacy of the right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital without their clients’ 
informed consent. 
I.  A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF CORPORATE WEALTH AND 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Before presenting an overview of binary economics and how 
it may be used to persuade corporations to act to realize for 
women and people of color the binary property right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital, it would be appropriate to 
consider briefly corporate wealth, fiduciary duties, and social 
responsibility. 
As a creature of the state, with strong persona status, the 
public corporation has special advantages for profitably 
organizing the mix of input factors necessary for wealth creation 
and distribution on a massive scale.  Indeed, the development of 
corporate law is both a response to, and facilitation of, modern 
economic enterprise.  It reflects and shapes economic behavior. 
Major corporations dominate the emerging global economy 
and the economy of virtually every nation.  In terms of productive 
capacity, capital ownership, jobs, and environmental impact, 
major corporations tell much of the story regarding economic 
activity.  America’s three thousand largest corporations, for 
example, own over ninety percent of the investable assets in the 
United States (excluding residential real estate).3 
But not all people are able to participate effectively in the 
ownership and capital acquisition of those corporations.  The 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) reports that its listed 
securities are owned directly or indirectly by over fifty million 
shareholders, but the median shareholder is forty-three years old 
with a portfolio of less than $15,000 in value.4  Thus, the 
distribution of common share ownership is a bit like the river 
that is two miles wide but mostly a few inches deep.  In the 
United States, for example, in approximate terms, 1% of the 
people through their direct and indirect share holdings own 40–
 
3 Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (2002). 
4 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK ONLINE, HIGHLIGHTS OF NYSE 
SHAREOWNER CENSUS REPORTS (1952–1990), http://www.nysedata.com/factbook 
(follow “The Investing Public” hyperlink; then follow “Highlights of NYSE 
shareowner census reports (1952–1990)” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
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50% of the marketable securities; 10% of the people own 90%; the 
remaining 90% of the people own the remaining 10% of 
marketable securities; and of that 90%, over half the people own 
none.5 
At the same time:  almost all capital is owned by major 
corporations; almost all capital owned by those corporations is 
acquired with the earnings of capital; much of it is acquired with 
borrowed money; and all is acquired with the indispensable 
foundation consisting of a stable property, monetary, credit, and 
market system dependent on government regulation, 
maintenance, protection, and enforcement.  In the case of major 
prime credit-worthy companies in the United States, the sources 
of funds for capital acquisition, in approximate terms, are as 
follows: 70% with retained earnings, 23% with debt, and 7% with 
direct issuance of shares of stock.6  Relatively little capital is 
acquired with the earnings of labor.  The vast majority of people 
in every nation have little or no participation in the capital 
acquisition of the world’s major corporations. 
The primary purpose of corporate finance is to enable 
corporations to acquire capital before they have earned the 
money to pay for it.  Under the prevailing system of corporate 
finance, as corporate assets grow and are continually used to buy 
additional assets with their earnings, they benefit people 
primarily in proportion to existing wealth.  Under this approach, 
the rich benefit the most, the middle class benefit less, and the 
poor (“the least of these”) benefit least of all.  Looking at the 
economy as a whole, the system offers (1) growing capital 
ownership and most of the best jobs to the well-capitalized, (2) 
the remaining jobs and welfare to others, and (3) goods and 
services to anyone with money or credit to buy them, while the 
negative effects of corporate production are “externalized” so that 
they are borne, to the extent possible, by persons other than the 
corporation and perhaps its privileged investors and employees.  
Those who own little or nothing are offered jobs, welfare, and 
 
5 See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY 
OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 11–12 (1995) [hereinafter WOLFF, TOP HEAVY]; Edward N. 
Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced: America’s Growing Concentration of Wealth, AM. 
PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 58 [hereinafter Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced]. 
6 See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE (2d ed. 1984); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An 
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 613, 648 (1988). 
CP1_ASHFORD 2/6/2006  9:10:03 PM 
2005] MEMO ON BINARY ECONOMICS 1227 
cheaper products as their participation in economic growth, but 
they are effectively denied the governmental policies that assist 
well-capitalized owners in acquiring additional capital with the 
earnings of capital. 
According to many, the advantages of doing business in the 
corporate form, the sheer size and impact of large corporations on 
society, and the attendant concentration of wealth and power call 
for a corporate social responsibility toward those affected by the 
corporation that may, in particular contexts, override the 
fiduciary responsibility to the corporation’s existing shareholders. 
Clearly governments can and do create opportunities for, and 
impose obligations on, corporations that have distributional and 
redistributional consequences.  Beyond obligations specified by 
law and regulation, what is required of corporations and 
corporate fiduciaries?  In terms relevant to corporate social 
responsibility, the question can be expressed as follows:  in 
setting the wealth maximization and distribution goals of the 
corporation, what other interest(s), beyond the interests of the 
residual claimants, who are usually common shareholders, that 
relate to other stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers, 
neighbors, and others including flora, fauna, and the 
environment—may, should, or must corporate fiduciaries take 
into account?  Thus, the debate regarding the existence and scope 
of corporate social responsibility can be cast as a debate 
regarding duties of corporate fiduciaries with respect to the 
maximization and distribution of wealth owned by the 
corporation and the opportunities available to the corporation. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF BINARY ECONOMICS 
Binary economics can be distinguished from other economic 
schools by three related propositions: 
(1)  Labor and capital are “independent” or “binary” 
factors of production; or in other words, they are 
“independently productive”; 
(2)  Technology makes capital much more productive than 
labor; and 
(3)  Capital has a strong, positive distributive relationship 
to growth such that the more broadly capital is acquired, 
(a) the more it can be profitably employed to increase 
output, and (b) the more an economy (and major 
corporations within the economy) will profitably grow. 
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According to the binary view of production, although labor 
and capital may cooperate, just as people may cooperate, to do 
work, each factor, the human and the non-human, provides its 
own “independent productiveness.”  In this context, it is 
important to distinguish between “productivity,” which is the 
ratio of the output of all factors of production, divided by the 
input of one factor, usually labor, and “productiveness,” which 
retrospectively means “work done” and prospectively means 
“productive capacity.” 
According to Adam Smith, the primary role of capital is to 
increase labor productivity.7  Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall (widely 
credited for neoclassical economics), and J.M. Keynes did not 
disagree.8  Indeed, in his General Theory, Keynes distilled the 
economy to three fundamental variables—time, money, and 
labor—and treated capital as a dependent variable.9  In binary 
economics, (1) capital and labor are equally fundamental, 
independent (i.e., binary) variables and (2) the primary role of 
capital is to replace and vastly supplement the work of labor 
(“labor productiveness”) with the work of capital (“capital 
productiveness”). 
The “independent productiveness” of labor and capital can be 
illustrated by considering the work of digging holes and hauling 
sacks.  A person can dig a hole in four hours by hand and in one 
hour with a shovel (capital).  According to mainstream economic 
analysis, with a shovel, labor productivity increases by a factor of 
four.  But from a binary perspective, per hole, with the shovel, 
labor is contributing only twenty-five percent of its former 
productiveness, and the shovel is contributing seventy-five 
percent.  The independent productiveness of capital is more 
clearly revealed in the work of hauling sacks: a person can haul 
one sack, one mile, in one hour and is exhausted.  In the same 
time, with a horse, ten sacks can be hauled four times as far, 
yielding a forty-fold increase in output, and with a truck, five 
hundred sacks can be hauled forty times as far, yielding a twenty 
thousand-fold increase in output.  The horse and truck are doing 
 
7 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 332 (photo. reprint 1981) (Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). 
8 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 213–17 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1964) (1936); KARL 
MARX, CAPITAL 188 (Friedrich Engels ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) 
(1887). 
9 See KEYNES, supra note 8, at 213–14. 
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essentially all of the extra work. 
Based on its independent productiveness, capital has six 
powers that are important to production and growth.  Capital 
can: 
(1)  replace labor by doing what was formerly done by 
labor; 
(2)  vastly supplement the work of labor by performing 
much more of the kind of work that humans can do; 
(3)  do work that labor alone can never do (e.g., elevators 
lift tons thousands of feet in the air; airplanes fly; 
scientific instruments unleash forces that create computer 
chips that cannot be made by hand; fruit trees make fruit 
while all farmers can do is assist in the process); 
(4)  work without labor, as in the case of washing 
machines, windmills, automatic tellers, robots, and fruit 
trees; 
(5)  pay for itself out of its future earnings (the basic rule 
of business investment); and 
(6)  distribute the income necessary to purchase its output 
(the logic of double-entry book-keeping). 
The first four powers concern what might be considered the “real 
economy” powers of capital; the latter two are powers that are 
most clearly revealed in a private property, market economy with 
a stable credit system protected by a reliable legal system. 
Each of these powers of capital contributes to the growth, 
including mere labor replacement, which produces the same 
physical output while liberating the time of workers for other 
activity including leisure.  However, only the first power directly 
involves the mere substitution of capital for labor.  Thus, 
although some economists, teachers of law and (neoclassical) 
economics, and policy advocates use the marginal efficiency 
theory of neoclassical economics as the foundation for a general 
theory of growth,10 the capital/labor substitution process is only 
one component of growth, operating after the creation of greatly 
 
10 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 252 (6th ed. 2003). 
“What Adam Smith referred to as a nation’s wealth, what this book refers to as 
efficiency, and what a layman might call the size of the pie, has always been an 
important value . . . .” For a critique of this approach on positive and ethical 
grounds, see Robert Ashford, Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in 
Teaching Law-Related Economic Issues, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 150-52 (2004); 
see also James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, 
and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW AND HISTORY REV. 
275 (1997). 
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increased productive capacity.  Moreover, from the binary 
perspective, the wealth enhancing contribution to efficient 
pricing and resource allocation is severely limited so long as the 
distribution of capital acquisition remains narrow.11 
When analyzing how production and productive capacity 
have grown since the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 
1776, mainstream market economics interprets the role of capital 
as merely facilitative: capital increases human productivity, 
thereby allowing for a rise in output per unit of labor input, 
higher wages, and the employment of more labor.  According to 
binary economics, in contributing to economic growth, capital 
does much more than increase the productivity of the humans 
who work with it.  Increasingly, capital is doing a growing 
portion of the total work.  Thus, economic growth is primarily the 
result of increasing capital productiveness rather than increasing 
labor productivity.  The economic imperative is generally to 
produce more with more productive capital and less labor.  
Therefore, although capital may be seen to concentrate higher 
productivity into fewer workers, as the general rule, per unit of 
output and in the aggregate, the primary effect of technological 
advance is to make capital more productive than labor and 
thereby to replace and vastly supplement the productiveness of 
labor with ever greater capital productiveness. 
Moreover, capital works on both sides of the production-
consumption economic equation by providing vastly increasing 
productive capacity and production, and capacity to distribute 
income and leisure.  According to binary economists, in a private 
property, market economy, it is the capacity of capital to do much 
 
11 Frequently, neoclassical economists stress that prices determine distribution, 
but less frequently teach that distribution also determines prices.  So long as most 
people own little or no capital, most consumer goods and services will be worth the 
work people are willing to do by their labor to acquire them.  This is (1) how Adam 
Smith and John Maynard Keynes saw it, (2) the foundation of price theory, and (3) 
in an economy in which capital ownership is highly concentrated, empirically the 
“labor theory of value” in practice.  However, in an economy in which ownership is 
much more broadly distributed, the value of goods and services is not limited to the 
work people are willing and able to do by way of their labor, but also includes the 
work they are willing and able to let their capital do. Based on human effort alone, 
few sacks are “worth hauling” before the hauler becomes exhausted.  With a horse, 
many more sacks are worth hauling; and the economy of sack-hauling will grow as 
horse (and truck) ownership becomes more broadly distributed.  Thus, people 
express value not only by the work they do but also by the work they let their capital 
do.  This is another expression of the principle of binary growth. See generally 
ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2. 
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more work and to distribute much more income and leisure that 
explains how the broader distribution of its ownership has a 
positive impact on the fuller employment of productive capacity, 
capital accumulation, and growth. 
III.  THE QUESTION OF UNUTILIZED PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY 
When assisting clients to identify and secure their essential 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities, it is important for 
lawyers to identify relevant issues helpful to clients that have 
been left out of the discussion.  From a binary perspective, with 
regard to the interests of women and people of color, one of the 
most important issues generally left out of the discussions on 
corporate governance, fiduciary duties, and social responsibility 
is the question of unutilized productive capacity (“UPC”). 
The recognition that an economy has (or may have) a 
substantial amount of UPC significantly alters the moral and 
practical content of the debate on economic policy.  If people 
languish in deprivation in a context where there is no unused 
capacity to produce more, then apart from charity, the moral 
question is whether it is right to compel the redistribution from 
the richer Peter to support the poorer Paul; and the practical 
question is whether such compulsory redistribution will 
positively or negatively affect the amount of future production 
available to Peter and Paul.  But if people languish in 
deprivation, when the capacity to produce more does exist, then 
as a practical matter, Paul can at least in theory be enriched 
without compulsory redistribution from Peter; and it is 
incumbent on counsel, other fiduciaries, and all people of good 
will to question the adequacy of existing economic approaches to 
productive capacity and to look for better approaches to economic 
policy related to productive capacity.  Thus, binary economists 
believe that by focusing attention on the question of UPC, 
attorneys for economically disadvantaged people will be better 
able to serve their clients. 
There are, of course, different definitions of unutilized 
productive capacity depending upon the purpose of economic 
inquiry, and lawyers must carefully consider which definition or 
definitions will best serve the interests of their clients.  
Mainstream economic analysis generally employs a narrow and 
frequently documented “static” approach to UPC that focuses 
primarily on existing assets and available labor at a given wage.  
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The presently unemployed portion of each existing or available 
factor is the “static UPC” for that factor. 
In considering the question of UPC, however, a corporate 
fiduciary cannot think merely in terms of existing capital and 
available labor.  A definition of unutilized capacity which looks 
only to existing assets and available labor is a limited conception 
that ignores the competitive and wealth-enhancing implications 
of advancing technology, major capital investment, changes in 
skills, preferences, and environmental factors and a broader 
pattern of capital acquisition over time.  This broader 
timeframe—in which technology, major capital investment, 
skills, preferences, environmental factors, and ownership 
distribution are variable—is an essential foundation for much of 
the corporate planning required of corporate fiduciaries.12  Such a 
timeframe is certainly not the exclusive domain of neoclassical 
economic analysis, which generally holds technology, skills, 
preferences, environmental factors, and major capital investment 
constant and ignores the distribution of ownership. 
Thus, from the perspective of corporations and corporate 
fiduciaries, a central question is: What business strategy should 
be pursued to most profitably acquire, employ, and dispose of 
corporate assets over time?  With respect to those assets, if any 
substantial amount of unutilized productive capacity exists and 
could be profitably employed, corporate profits and shareholder 
wealth would increase accordingly. 
The question of unutilized capacity is also a central issue for 
people concerned about the welfare of economically 
disadvantaged people and for government policymakers vested 
with a responsibility in matters of economic welfare.  When there 
is unutilized productive capacity of an economy’s major 
corporations, there is a capacity to provide more basic necessities, 
such as food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and healthcare, 
and simple comforts and conveniences by way of greener and 
more socially responsible industrial processes and practices.13  
The ever-present threat of plant closings, downsizing, and layoffs 
can be understood as a reflection of unutilized productive 
capacity.  Many economic assaults on the environment resulting 
 
12 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
13 See Ashford, supra note 3, at 1203; Robert Ashford, Binary Economics and the 
Case for Broader Ownership 4, available at http://www.globaljusticemovement.org/ 
subpages_online_library/ashford1.pdf  (July 20, 2003). 
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from destructive production technologies (that continue despite 
the know-how to ameliorate or replace them with greener 
technologies that people cannot afford), can be understood as 
reflections of unutilized productive capacity. 
As in the case of corporate fiduciaries acting in the corporate 
interest, it is in the interest of women and people of color (and 
the duty of their attorneys, other advocates, and advisors) to 
focus on the question of unutilized productive capacity in the 
broader, what could be called “holistic,” sense that reflects the 
real potential to produce and distribute goods and services on a 
sustainable basis over time.  Thus, in the remainder of this 
Article, unless otherwise specifically noted, “unutilized 
productive capacity” includes static UPC and also the broader 
holistic, fiduciary understanding of UPC. 
To some people, the question of the existence of unutilized 
productive capacity, in the broader, holistic sense of the term, 
may be simply a matter of opinion.  But in law, like the question 
of valuing a company, it is also a question of fact. 
Taking the assumed perfect efficiency or approximate perfect 
efficiency of markets as the best starting point for economic 
analysis, some people believe that a major economy like that of 
the United States and major prime credit-worthy companies 
within the economy have little or no unutilized productive 
capacity.  “If there were an appreciable amount of unutilized 
productive capacity,” they argue “it would surely be employed.  
This is what rational people acting with a profit motive do, and if 
people refuse to act rationally in this way they will be driven out 
of business by others who do.”  But in my experience, many more 
people do not believe that markets are that efficient and instead 
believe that there is substantial and growing unutilized 
productive capacity. 
On this point, a simple thought experiment might be 
illuminating.  Suppose you were king or queen of the world and 
could ordain any economic policy as the law of the world, and 
your goal were to feed, clothe, and shelter the world, and provide 
people with the resources to develop themselves to their highest 
good.  Although you might fall short of your desired goal, would it 
be easier to approach your goal now than one hundred, two 
hundred, or three hundred years ago?  And, to change the 
hypothetical, if you were still the king or queen of the world and 
(just as the Pharaohs loved pyramids) you love unutilized 
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productive capacity.  It is not enough for you to have two closed 
manufacturing plants in a particular locale (with the lost jobs 
gone to manufacturers overseas where wages do not internalize 
such factors as health and retirement benefits, safety and 
environmental standards, military costs, and infrastructural 
benefits of the United States); instead, you prefer to have seven 
more such plants.  Would it be easier to build seven such 
unutilized plants today than one, two, or three hundred years 
ago? 
Thus, if asked to determine the facts with due diligence, I 
predict that the general counsel of most prime credit-worthy 
companies would, after consulting with all appropriate experts, 
conclude that their companies, even as they determine the need 
to effect major downsizings, plant closings, and lay-offs, owned 
the productive capacity with available capital assets and labor to 
profitably increase output by perhaps 10–20%, or more, at lower 
unit costs if there were only the customers with money to buy 
what could be readily produced.  This would apply not only to 
consumer goods but also to producer goods, so that within 
existing unutilized productive capacity, there is the capacity to 
create even more unutilized productive capacity. 
Of course, not everyone would agree with my prediction, 
which is based on experience and anecdotal evidence but no 
scientific validation.  Nevertheless, a lesson from economic 
history and the history of economic thought may be instructive.  
In the Great Depression of the 1930s, society was faced with a 
major anomaly that politically could not be ignored: the anomaly 
of vast unutilized productive capacity, even in the limited static 
sense, alongside widespread need and want among willing and 
able, but unemployed people.14  It was a time when passenger 
trains rolled by with few passengers able to pay the fares, and 
freight trains rolled by empty of freight, but carrying people who 
were traveling the country looking for work.  The persistence of 
unutilized productive capacity at that time, and the failure of 
classical and neoclassical theory to provide government and 
society with a satisfactory theoretical explanation or practical 
solution for the anomaly provided the political foundation for the 
recognition of Keynesian economics as a mainstream school of 
 
14 Ashford, supra note 13,  at 2. 
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thought.15 
Unlike the 1930s, presently unutilized productive capacity is 
not explicitly a major focus of mainstream economic and political 
analysis.  Generally, people do not get funding, prizes, or much 
recognition for addressing the question of unutilized productive 
capacity.  As a policy issue, UPC rarely enters the mainstream 
discussion.  Yet in ways important to corporate profitability, 
more unutilized productive capacity seems to exist now than in 
the 1930s.  In my experience, most people believe that the 
western-style capitalist economies could more nearly feed, clothe, 
and shelter all the world’s people today than in 1935, despite 
substantial population growth since then.  Although today’s 
percentages of static UPC may be far smaller than the 
percentages that prevailed in 1935, most people I know believe 
that in the fuller, holistic sense of the term, the unutilized 
productive capacity of major corporations today is far greater 
than it was during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Despite 
neoclassical assumptions of rising costs and diminishing returns, 
much of the unused productive capacity is generally marked by 
diminishing unit costs and increasing economies of production 
made unprofitable only by insufficient consumer demand even at 
discount prices. 
Again learning from history, comparing the political climate 
during the 1930s to the political climate today, it seems most 
reasonable to conclude that when the existence of substantial 
unutilized productive capacity is undeniable, the interests of the 
economically disadvantaged become matters of much greater 
concern to the government, private foundations, major economic 
players in the economy, and the electorate. 
So if the question of unutilized productive capacity is of 
importance to economically disadvantaged people, and also to the 
interests of major corporations, attorneys for economically 
disadvantaged people should ask:  (1) “Why is unutilized 
productive capacity not a major part of the present discussion?,” 
and (2) “How can unutilized productive capacity be included in 
the discussion in a way that works for the benefit of economically 
disadvantaged people?” 
 
15 See Bill Gerrard, Keynes, The Keynesian and the Classics: A Suggested 
Interpretation, 105 ECON. J. 445, 449 (1995) (characterizing the central theoretical 
task of Keynesian economics as explaining the outcome of persistent 
underemployment). 
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Unfortunately, mainstream economics has no coherent 
position on unutilized productive capacity in the holistic sense.  
Rather than consensus, it provides controversy.  It is not even 
clear that mainstream economics has a non-controversial way of 
measuring holistic unutilized productive capacity.  Thus, on the 
authority of economic theory, there is no sound basis to dismiss 
the controversy regarding unutilized productive capacity merely 
by arguing that reformers have the burden of proving the 
existence of unutilized productive capacity in the holistic sense of 
the term. 
In fact, mainstream economics fragments into different 
schools on the existence, extent, and significance of unutilized 
productive capacity and what to do about it.  These schools offer 
different guidance to private corporations and public 
policymakers.  Neoclassical economics assumes perfect 
competition and efficiency as the starting point of analysis.16  In 
the world of perfect neoclassical efficiency, unutilized capacity, 
beyond the need for peaks in market demand and an insurance 
for emergencies beyond the predictable, is an anomaly that 
should not persist for long.  In efficient markets, unproductive 
assets are sold, even at salvage if necessary.  Even before they 
become partially or totally unutilized, assets not earning 
competitive returns for their owners are sold to those whose rate 
of return can be enhanced by the acquisition.17  Moreover, 
according to neoclassical economics, “as markets become more 
competitive, unutilized productive capacity should decrease, not 
increase.”18  For those who believe that this logic describes the 
ongoing reality experienced in a national economy, there is little 
or no sustained unutilized capacity beyond the amount that is 
efficient to maintain.19  Plant closings, downsizings, and lay-offs 
are signs of greater, not less, efficiency.  For those who believe 
 
16 See Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and 
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 540–41 (1998) (describing the perfect competition 
model of neoclassical economics). See generally Joan Robinson, What is Perfect 
Competition?, 49 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1934). 
17 Ashford, supra note 3, at 1202. 
18 Id. 
19 The history that gave rise to the antitrust laws reveals, however, that vast 
unutilized capacity can also be of great value to a rational, self-interested monopolist 
because it discourages potential competitors from investing the resourses to 
compete. Those enjoying monopoly profits are of course benefited if the existence of 
unutilized capacity never enters the discussions of economic policy. 
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markets are efficient or nearly efficient, there is little or no 
unutilized productive capacity (including little or no involuntary 
labor unemployment) that exists by reason of the market’s failure 
to distribute sufficient demand for goods and service. 
But to most observers, these conclusions are belied by 
experience.  From many people, I have heard claims that today 
there is a growing technological capacity to feed, clothe, and 
shelter the world if there were only sufficient income to buy what 
can be readily produced.  However close to the truth such a claim 
is in the year 2005, it was less true in 1905, and still less true in 
1805. 
Based on a conception that confuses a neoclassical theory of 
marginal efficiency with an unnamed theory of growth,20 so-
called free market reforms have been initiated on the national 
and international level supposedly to make markets more 
efficient.  Nevertheless, as markets have globalized and allegedly 
become more efficient, unutilized productive capacity of the 
world’s major corporations has, in the eyes of many people, 
paradoxically increased rather than decreased.  The neoclassical, 
generic solution of simply “deregulating” markets, without regard 
for the remaining regulated, protected, institutional advantages 
of private property that enrich some while excluding others, is, 
therefore, suspect in this context. 
According to Keynesian analysis, there is indeed persistent 
unutilized productive capacity that belies the neoclassical 
assumptions of near-perfect efficiency.  Untapped growth 
potential and underemployment of labor and capital persist 
despite classical and neoclassical economic theory to the 
contrary.21  Markets are far from perfectly competitive, and their 
operation results in a persistent shortfall in “effective demand.”22  
“The result is an endemic underutilization of people and 
resources that can, at least, be partially corrected by government 
action.”23  But, in addressing unutilized productive capacity, the 
 
20 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
21 See PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A 
FOUNDATION FOR SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 6–8 (1994) (observing that Keynes argued that neoclassical economic 
theories could not account for the persistent unemployment rates of the Great 
Depression). 
22 See generally KEYNES, supra note 8, 23–34 (defining “effective demand”). 
23 Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1565. 
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Keynesian analysis attaches no special significance to the 
distribution of capital ownership.  Indeed, Keynes specifically 
says that in understanding his approach, 
It is preferable to regard labour, including, of course, the 
personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the 
sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of 
technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective 
demand.  This partly explains why we have been able to take 
the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in 
our economic system, apart from units of money and of time.24 
Accordingly, Keynesian analysis attaches no fundamental 
significance to the distribution of capital ownership because in 
Keynes’s model, capital earns no independent income and has no 
value apart from labor.  (Consequently, Keynesian analysis 
attaches no fundamental importance to extending to all people 
the competitive right to acquire capital with the earnings of 
capital.)  Further, the Keynesian analysis makes no fundamental 
distinction between the distribution and redistribution of income 
and capital.  In light of the law of private property, however, 
lawyers should be skeptical of an analysis that makes no 
distinction between the distribution and redistribution of capital 
and income.25 
Moreover, although Keynesian strategies remain a central 
element in the workings of every major economy (witness, for 
example the vast public expenditures in the United States), 
many if not most people would say that unutilized productive 
capacity persists and is apparently growing in the United States 
and most industrial economies.  Thus, although Keynesian 
economics is intended to address and remedy the problem of 
unutilized productive capacity, there is reason to doubt its 
efficacy with regard to holistic UPC. 
For those who recognize its existence, unutilized productive 
capacity is an important economic phenomenon that mainstream 
economic theory has failed to adequately explain or remedy.  
Theoretically, the persistence of unutilized capacity challenges 
 
24 KEYNES, supra note 8, at 213–14. See generally JOHN FENDER, 
UNDERSTANDING KEYNES: AN ANALYSIS OF ‘THE GENERAL THEORY’ (1981). 
25 Note that the Keynesian approach is not in harmony with the law of private 
property, which sees capital and labor as independent earners, and which 
necessarily distinguishes between the distribution and redistribution of income and 
capital. See Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1541. 
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the foundation of mainstream economics.  A major aspect of the 
political, social, and moral debate in Western societies regarding 
economic policy is related to the employment of productive 
capacity, both utilized and unutilized.  The economic and political 
prospects for greater and more broadly shared prosperity for 
women, people of color, and poor and working people are limited 
by mainstream understanding of policies related to utilized and 
unutilized productive capacity.  It would serve the interest of 
economically disadvantaged people if they and their counsel 
could discover and advance an approach to unutilized productive 
capacity that better serves their interests. 
When accepted mainstream theories fail to adequately 
explain or remedy an important phenomenon, one scientific and 
lawyerly way to discover better theories is to identify and 
suspend one or more of the assumptions that those theories share 
in common and then to explore the counter assumptions and 
their implications.  Although they differ in many respects, all 
mainstream approaches to unutilized productive capacity share 
two basic assumptions:  (1) the primary role of capital is to make 
labor more productive and (2) there is no substantial, 
fundamental, positive relationship between the distribution of 
capital acquisition and the employment of unutilized capacity 
and growth.  By suspending these mainstream economic 
assumptions, one is led to two basic premises of binary 
economics. 
IV.  THE BINARY HYPOTHESIS REGARDING UNUTILIZED 
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY 
Binary economics provides a new understanding and 
suggests new strategies regarding the persistence of vast, and 
many would say growing, unutilized productive capacity in 
markets that are supposedly becoming more competitive and 
efficient.  Particularly noteworthy is the unutilized productive 
capacity of the assets owned by major prime credit-worthy public 
corporations.  As a matter of policy, this is where an enlightened 
approach to corporate economic policy can have its greatest 
beneficial impact on industry, corporate and shareholder wealth, 
people of color, women, and generally people who own little or no 
capital. 
As previously noted, looking at the question holistically over 
a period of time required of fiduciaries, binary economists 
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maintain that unutilized capacity is not merely a static ratio of 
existing unutilized capital and labor divided by available capital 
and labor, but also includes the unutilized capacity to create even 
more unutilized productive capacity.  Noting that present 
demand for capital investment is dependent on demand for 
consumer goods in a future period,26 binary economists reason 
that a voluntary pattern of steadily broadening ownership 
promises more production-based consumer demand in future 
years and, therefore, more demand for capital investment in 
earlier years.  Thus, a broader distribution of capital acquisition, 
ownership, and income strengthens the promise of capital to pay 
for itself out of its future earnings, increases the rate of capital 
cost recovery, and makes profitable the employment of more, and 
increasingly more productive, capital along with the labor 
necessary to build, deliver, install, and operate it. 
Thus, by relaxing the unproven assumption of mainstream 
economics (that a broader pattern of capital acquisition has no 
potent, positive, distributive relationship to the profitable 
employment of unutilized capacity and the promotion of growth), 
the contrary binary assumption (that a broader pattern of capital 
acquisition has a potent, positive, distributive relationship to the 
profitable employment of unutilized capacity and the promotion 
of growth) provides an alternative explanation for much 
unutilized productive capacity. 
In other words, the binary hypothesis is that much 
unutilized productive capacity is the consequence of concentrated 
capital ownership.  Concentrated capital ownership fails to 
distribute broadly the consumer demand necessary to purchase 
the output of increasingly capital-intensive production.  
Concentrated ownership in turn is the consequence of faulty 
market institutions and practices that: 
(1)  effectively exclude most people from the process of 
acquiring capital with the earnings of capital, and 
(2)  thereby monopolize and suppress the true productive 
capacity of capital, by preventing capital from 
(a)  being acquired more broadly and rapidly, and 
(b)  thereafter distributing to consumers the income to 
purchase what can increasingly be produced by 
capital. 
 
26 See generally HAROLD G. MOULTON, THE FORMATION OF CAPITAL 37–48 
(1935). 
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According to binary theory, if markets were structured to 
diffuse ownership voluntarily by enabling all people to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital, then within the timeframe of 
capital investment projections of major U.S. corporations (usually 
five years) increasing consumer demand (more widely distributed 
through the broader acquisition of productive capital with the 
earnings of capital) will profitably employ more unutilized 
productive capacity and produce more growth. 
For example, within a period of perhaps five to fourteen 
years, if members of the poor and middle classes are enabled to 
compete with existing owners for the acquisition of corporate 
shares representing the capital requirements of companies 
worthy of prime credit, these poor and middle class people would 
bring to the corporate finance bargaining table a chip not 
possessed by existing owners: a pent up appetite for more of the 
necessities and simple luxuries of life that richer people enjoy.  
After the capital has paid for itself, the earnings of capital 
acquired by members of the poor and middle class, if paid to 
them, will distribute more consumer demand than if that capital 
had been acquired by the wealthy.  If that capital had been 
acquired by existing owners, its income would have been courted 
for additional investment, but in the context of less consumer 
demand.  Compared to the investment opportunities that would 
have existed without the  prospect of a broader pattern of capital 
acquisition, the broader market distribution of capital acquisition 
and income generated in a binary economy will create greater 
investment opportunities for existing owners as well as for the 
new binary owners. 
Therefore, mainstream economic theory can be enhanced by 
considering the return on capital not only as a function of its 
scarcity, the wage rate, and the interest rate, but also as a 
function of the increasing productiveness of capital and the 
distribution of its ownership.  The resultant distribution-based 
(binary) growth is not caused by increased human productivity, 
capital deepening, or accelerated technological advance.  It is 
specifically the result of the broader distribution of capital 
acquisition.  This distribution-based relationship to the rate of 
return on capital and growth is not revealed by classical and 
neoclassical analyses which assume that the return on capital is 
a function of only its scarcity and labor productivity.  Likewise, 
Keynesian analysis, which reduces the operation of the economy 
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to time, money, and labor, cannot yield a conclusion that growth 
and the return on capital are independent functions of the 
productiveness capital and the distribution of its ownership. 
With its labor-based, productivity analysis, mainstream 
economic strategies rely on policies that facilitate capital 
acquisition primarily for well-capitalized people and jobs and 
welfare for everyone else.  But binary analysis indicates that jobs 
and welfare alone cannot distribute sufficient consumer income 
to employ existing unutilized capacity and promote sustainable 
growth without the additional consumer income which would 
naturally result from the increased productiveness of capital and 
a broader pattern of capital acquisition. 
V.  APPLYING BINARY PRINCIPLES TO THE UNITED STATES 
ECONOMY 
The logic underlying the principle of binary growth (i.e., 
capital-ownership distribution-based growth) can be understood 
and implemented by considering the three thousand largest 
companies in the United States, and then focusing on a subset 
comprised of prime credit-worthy companies.  Most of these 
companies exhibit the frustrating essence of unutilized 
productive capacity.  At diminishing unit costs, they can produce 
much more of the goods and services people dearly need and 
want.  However, the consumer spending power to render more 
production profitable even at diminishing unit costs is lacking. 
As noted above, presently, almost all new capital is acquired 
with the earnings of capital, and much of it is acquired with 
borrowed money.  The ownership of this corporate wealth is 
highly concentrated so that approximately 1% of the people own 
40–50% of the wealth and 10% own 90% of the wealth, leaving 
90% of people owning little or none.  Thus, capital returns its 
value at a rate reflective of its long-term (suppressed) earning 
capacity as it buys itself for a small minority of the population.27 
If the techniques presently used to enable existing owners to 
acquire capital with earnings of capital were opened 
competitively to all people, then in an economy with 
underutilized productive capacity, the demand for capital 
investment would increase as its income is increasingly 
 
27 Wolff, How the Pie Is Sliced, supra note 5. See generally WOLFF, TOP HEAVY, 
supra note 5 (discussing the disparate increase in wealth along class lines). 
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distributed to would-be consumers with unsatisfied needs and 
wants.  The binary growth potential in this situation can be 
understood as a manifestation of the law of supply and demand 
within a “binary timeframe”—the time expected for well-
managed capital to pay for its acquisition costs (a period usually 
no longer than five to seven years) and then to begin earning a 
net income for its owners.  This is a time period in which 
technology, capital investment, and the distribution of ownership 
are variable rather than fixed.  Because demand for capital goods 
is dependent on anticipated demand for consumer goods in a 
future period, the broader pattern of capital acquisition in a 
binary economy will structure more production-based consumer 
demand in the future period, and will therefore provide market 
incentive for more capital investment in the earlier period.  
Admittedly, there would be a gestation period (a period 
somewhat shorter than the capital cost recovery period and 
determined by the horizon for capital investment planning) 
before the distributional growth effects would become noticeable, 
but as will be explained, their cumulative effect over time may be 
remarkably significant. 
As previously noted, to acquire capital with the earnings of 
capital, well-capitalized people use:  (1) the pre-tax earnings of 
capital, (2) collateral, (3) credit, (4) market and insurance 
mechanisms to diversify and reduce risk, and (5) a monetary 
policy intended to protect private property.  The same 
institutions and practices that work profitably for well-
capitalized people can also work profitably for all people.  In an 
economy operating at less than full capacity, if capital can 
competitively pay for its acquisition costs out of its future 
earnings primarily for existing owners, it can do so even more 
profitably if all people are included in the acquisition process. 
Accordingly, to enable all people and major prime credit-
worthy corporations to capitalize on the potent distributive 
relationship between voluntary ownership-broadening capital 
acquisition and growth, a binary economy requires only modest 
reforms to open the market infrastructure governing corporate 
finance so that all people, not merely a minority of the people, are 
vested with competitive capital acquisition rights to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital. 
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A.  A Model of a Binary Economy 
The dynamic operation of a binary economy can be modeled 
with six basic institutions:  (1) Prime Credit-Worthy 
Corporations, (2) Capital Ownership-Broadening Trusts, (3) 
Banks, (4) Private Capital Credit Insurers, (5) the Capital 
Diffusion Reinsurance Corporation (the only new entity, modeled 
after the Federal Housing Administration), and (6) the Federal 
Reserve.  Figure 1 shows an ownership-broadening “binary 
financing” transaction consummated with the voluntary 
participation of each of these entities.  Figure 1 may be seen as a 
single binary financing transaction or the aggregate 
representation of all such transactions. 
In a binary economy, in addition to their usual means of 
acquiring capital assets (borrowing, retained earnings, and sale 
of shares), prime credit-worthy corporations could raise the funds 
to acquire capital assets by selling special full-dividend common 
shares to a Capital Ownership-Broadening Trust for the benefit 
of employees, customers, neighbors, and others, paid for with a 
bank loan to the Trust, insured by a private capital credit insurer 
and government reinsurer, and discounted at a rate of 99.75% by 
the Federal Reserve (with 1/4 of one percent reflecting its 
estimated administrative cost).  Once the capital acquisition loan 
repayment obligations are met, the full net capital earnings (net 
of reserves for depreciation, research, and development) would be 
paid to the binary owners to help them meet their needs and 
wants and to provide the basis for increased investment, 
employment, and production.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 The full payout of capital earnings (net of reserves for depreciation, research, 
and development) is essential to enable poor and working people to acquire capital 
with the earnings. If the capital earnings of poor and working people are taxed or 
retained by the corporation, the capital will not be able to repay its acquisition cost 
at a competitive rate and will not distribute needed income to provide for their needs 
and support sustained growth. 
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General Theory Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
B.  The Cost of Financing to Participating Corporations and the 
Binary Owners 
Based on the profitable capital credit experience of the 
Federal Housing Administration, the customary bankers spread, 
and the estimated administrative costs of Federal Reserve 
discounting, the combined cost of binary financing to the 
corporation and the beneficiaries will not, under most economic 
circumstances, exceed the following: 
 
(1) Capital Credit Insurance 2% 
(2) Customary Banker Spread 1–2% 
(3) Federal Reserve Discount 0.25% 
 Total 3.25–4.25% 
 
The reason underlying the low cost of financing rate is that 
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monetized credit does not use existing financial savings as the 
source of the loan and therefore does not require compensation 
for their use.  The estimated cost of capital credit insurance 
might be questioned, but it could even be doubled and still 
provide a competitive cost of financing in many instances. 
C.  Binary Growth in a Binary Timeframe 
Figure 2 illustrates the distributive, growth-sustaining 
feature of an ownership-broadening binary economy.  For 
simplicity, Figure 2 assumes a seven-year cost recovery period for 
capital investment.  It shows the number of years of annual 
acquisitions that will have paid for themselves over time.  The 
figure assumes that in every year after the implementation of the 
binary economy, some number, N, of an economy’s largest prime 
credit-worthy companies voluntarily have profitably utilized 
binary financing to acquire in the aggregate some percentage, X, 
of their capital investments.  Figure 2 also assumes that the 
capital credit insurance is properly priced to pay for those 
financings that fail to repay the acquisition loans so that N and X 
are net of those failures.  For simplicity, as a first iteration, the 
figure also assumes that N, X, and the rate of return on capital 
remain constant throughout the period. 
Although beginning slowly, the broadening distribution of 
capital ownership and income will increase steadily and thereby 
provide the basis for binary growth.  Each year after the initial 
cost recovery period of the most productive capital, more binary 
capital will have paid for itself and will be distributing capital 
income to members of the poor and middle class.  Consistent with 
the conservative assumption of a seven-year capital cost recovery 
period, Figure 2 shows the steady growth in the number of fully 
paid annual capital acquisitions.  In the eighth year, the first 
annual acquisition of capital will have paid for itself and will 
begin paying its full return to the new binary owners.  In the 
ninth year, the second annual capital acquisition will be fully 
paid for and will therefore begin paying its full return to the new 
binary owners.  In fourteen years, 50% of the annual capital 
acquisitions will have paid for themselves, and will have begun 
paying their full annual return to the new binary owners.  In the 
twenty-eighth year, 75% of the acquisitions will have paid for 
themselves; and so on.  In the long run, the linkage between 
supply (in the form of the incremental productive power of 
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capital) and demand (resulting from the widespread market 
distribution of capital income to consumers) approaches 100%.  
The more binary financing that is undertaken, the greater the 
distributional growth effects. 
With the prospect of more broadly distributed capital 
income, to maintain market share in the projected growing 
economy, producers will have to increase production and 
productive capacity by more fully utilizing existing capacity and 
creating more capacity.  Because present demand for capital 
goods is dependent on the anticipation of more future demand for 
consumer goods and services, the broader pattern of capital 
acquisition and resultant broader distribution of capital income 
should be reflected in increased capital spending within the 
timeframe required to acquire and employ the added capital 
necessary to increase production to satisfy the additional 
anticipated consumer demand.  Thus, for example, with a capital 
cost recovery period of seven years, and a capital planning 
investment horizon of five years, increased incentives for 
increased capital spending might materialize in the third year. 
 
Percent of Binary Capital Acquisitions that Fully Link Supply 
with Demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Indeed, the incentives for increased capital investment might 
start even earlier.  First, to the extent that the return on the 
equity represented by the binary shares exceeds the debt-
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Second, to the extent that consumers feel wealthier by reason of 
their capital ownership, their marginal savings and consumption 
rates will shift towards more consumption even before they begin 
to receive binary income.  Furthermore, the terms of the loan 
agreements may provide for increasing partial dividend 
payments directly to the beneficial owners as specified 
percentages of the loans and shares become fully paid. 
The broader distribution of capital ownership also has the 
capacity to reduce the need for taxes on corporations and 
individuals.  In light of government expenditures and tax-
transfer payments that are made to provide benefits to people 
who cannot afford those benefits (based on their labor earnings), 
to the extent that those people begin to receive income from 
capital (after it has paid for its acquisition costs) the 
government’s direct expenditures and tax-transfer payments can 
be reduced.  For example, if people who are receiving tax-transfer 
payments begin receiving capital income, the government can 
partially reduce future tax-transfer payments and give a tax 
credit in the following year to the corporation whose shares are 
earning that income for welfare recipients.  Thus, an economy 
that provides public corporations with a voluntary, ownership-
broadening means to enable people to acquire capital with the 
earnings of capital also provides a long-term means to reduce 
taxes, welfare dependence, and deficits. 
Moreover, to the extent that welfare recipients begin 
receiving capital income from the shares they have acquired with 
the earnings of capital, it would not be proper to call that income 
“redistribution,” because such income exists only to the extent 
that their capital has paid for itself and then earned net income 
(after paying all operating expenses, plus reserves for 
depreciation, research, and development).  From a binary 
perspective, the incremental binary consumer income is neither 
inflationary nor redistributionary because it exists only as a 
result of voluntary transactions, and only if the underlying 
capital has produced goods or services sufficient, first, to return 
its acquisition cost, and then to pay net income to its owners.  
The greater and more broadly distributed wealth is the result of 
increased production as a market response to the broader pattern 
of capital acquisition.29 
 
29 See Ashford, The Promise of Universal Capitalism, supra note 2, at 63-76, 79-
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VI.  ADVOCACY IN SUPPORT OF BINARY PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR 
WOMEN AND PEOPLE OF COLOR 
To acquire capital with the earnings of capital, public 
corporations and well-capitalized people use the pre-tax earnings 
of capital,30 non-recourse corporate credit, insurance and markets 
to cover risks of business failure, and a friendly monetary policy 
designed to protect private property.  Binary analysis reveals 
that the same institutions of capitalism that work profitably 
primarily for the few can be opened to work even more profitably 
if all people are endowed with competitive capital acquisition 
rights.  Operating without taking anything from existing owners, 
these institutions could be opened to provide the financial 
infrastructure to enable corporations to satisfy their credit-
worthy capital requirements even more profitably than at 
present while enabling their employees, consumers, neighbors, 
and other stakeholders to acquire full-dividend paying common 
shares of the participating corporations. 
Broadening the right to acquire capital with the earnings of 
capital is an important issue of interest-convergence among the 
vast majority of people of color, women, poor and working people, 
and public corporations.31  The convergent interest is to open the 
system of corporate finance to broaden capital acquisition so as to 
provide the foundation for (1) increasingly widespread prosperity 
for people who own little or no capital and (2) a growing economy 
in which public corporations can increasingly employ their 
productive capacity more fully and profitably. 
Through the years, many compassion and justice based 
 
87; Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, supra note 2, at 39-41; Ashford, Binary 
Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at 
1532. See generally ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2. 
30 Operating on a foundation of legislation and regulation, well-capitalized 
people enjoy reserves for depreciation, research and development, and tax credits, 
which enable owners to replace and modernize their capital and acquire additional 
capital with the pre-tax earnings of capital. These benefits that enable people to 
acquire capital with the pre-tax earnings of capital are largely denied to most people 
who own little or no capital. A laborer cannot depreciate the value of his earning 
capacity over her working life, but an owner can depreciate the cost of a machine 
that replaces her. By working to minimize taxable corporate and personal income 
while maximizing credits and deductions, tax accountants, advisors, and lawyers 
work to maximize the ability of owners to acquire capital with the pre-tax earnings 
of capital. Working pro-bono, the same professionals can work to secure the identical 
capital acquisition rights of people who own little or no capital. 
31 See Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 523 (1980). 
CP1_ASHFORD 2/6/2006  9:10:03 PM 
1250 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1221   
initiatives to help economically disadvantaged people have failed 
to meet their objectives because of resistance to redistribution.  
This resistance is based in part on a widely expressed, practical 
concern, fortified by mainstream economic theory, that 
redistribution will, or may, destroy incentives for productive 
activity.  This resistance also has a moral dimension based on the 
belief that assisting the economically disadvantaged should be 
voluntary rather than compulsory.  Not surprisingly, this 
resistance to redistribution frequently finds some of its most 
ardent expression from among those whose assets are being (or 
would be) redistributed against their will.  Many attorneys for 
the economically disadvantaged would concede that the anti-
redistribution sentiment is a powerful obstacle to such 
initiatives.  But the binary approach, based on universalizing the 
right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, does not 
require any redistribution of existing assets, but rather merely 
the opening of the capital markets to all people. 
The fact that binary growth does not require redistribution 
makes it an especially powerful approach for economically 
advantaged people in many contexts.  In the debate regarding 
Black reparations, for example, a major impediment to progress 
has been a widely advanced argument that it is wrong to require 
the present generation (many of whose ancestors were also the 
victims of exploitation, oppression, and genocide in other 
countries) to pay for the wrongs of the past for which they have 
no complicity.  Noting that the extension of binary rights 
requires no redistribution, Professor Anthony Cook has 
eloquently endorsed the binary approach and advanced its 
application as a means to achieve just reparations for the 
institution of slavery, without redistribution, by according to the 
descendants of slaves priority in the process by which the binary 
property right is extended to the economically disadvantaged.32  
In Professor Cook’s view, the inclusive, binary approach is in 
harmony with the approach of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King 
in calling for the “beloved community.”33 
Bearing in mind that the duties of corporate fiduciaries flow 
first to the corporation and secondarily to the shareholders,34 
 
32 See Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian 
Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 999–1014 (2000). 
33 Id. at 1013–14. 
34 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
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attorneys for women and people of color should join with 
attorneys for the economically disadvantaged, consumers, 
employees and their retirement plans, and other stakeholders.  
Together they should approach corporate counsel and urge them, 
within the bounds of their fiduciary responsibilities, to explore 
and advise their corporate clients of the substantial benefits to 
corporations and society of the binary ownership-broadening 
approach to corporate finance.35 
The principles of binary economics thus suggest that public 
corporations have an inherent interest in considering ways to 
broaden their share ownership.  These principles reveal a little 
understood opportunity for public corporations to enhance their 
wealth substantially over time by working in concert to open the 
existing system of corporate finance to enable their employees, 
consumers, neighbors, and others to acquire capital with the 
earnings of capital. 
According to binary theory, the more broadly capital is 
acquired in voluntary market transactions, the faster an 
economy, and large corporations within that economy, will grow.  
More broadly distributed capital acquisition will: 
(1)  distribute more consumer demand, thereby enhancing 
the market for good and services; 
(2)  profitably employ more unutilized capacity (both 
capital and labor); 
(3)  increase capital investment; 
(4)  accelerate technological advance; 
(5)  enhance employee productivity, consumer loyalty, and 
general goodwill among neighbors of participating 
companies and the general population; 
(6)  reduce the need for taxation, other forms of 
redistribution, and associated transactions costs; 
(7)  enhance general wealth of most major corporations, 
their shareholders, and the general population; 
(8)  broaden, deepen, and more fully democratize the 
institution of private property by opening its benefits to 
more people; and 
(9)  strengthen political democracy by opening capital 
acquisition with the earnings of capital to more people.36 
 
CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (1983). 
35 See Ashford, supra note 3; Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1575–77. 
36 See Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social 
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Of course, as to some of these benefits, there may be a so-
called “collective action problem”: no single corporation can be 
assured of maintaining its share of the overall growth.  For 
example, people encapitalized by one producer may use their 
additional capital income to buy products of a competitor that 
has no participation in the binary financing; but as a matter of 
corporate interest, it is generally better to compete for market 
share of a faster growing economy than a slower growing, 
stagnant, or shrinking one. 
Moreover, not all of the benefits of binary financing are 
subject to the collective action problem.  For example, financing 
at least a portion of its capital acquisition by way of the binary 
ownership-broadening alternative has promise to benefit a 
corporation by encapitalizing: 
(1)  employees (by increasing worker productivity and 
commitment to the welfare of their employer, and by 
decreasing pilferage, absenteeism, and monitoring costs); 
(2)  consumers of the corporation’s product (witness the 
rationale underlying existing frequent flier programs and 
other consumer-patronage plans); 
(3)  neighbors (with most major corporations owning 
facilities generally surrounded by poor and working 
people living nearby, there is the prospect of reduced 
vandalism and security costs, and better relations with 
local governments); and 
(4)  welfare recipients (as noted above, a corporation that 
encapitalizes welfare recipients can be given tax credits 
equal to all or a portion of the transfer payments that are 
replaced in any year with capital income that is earned 
from the corporation’s shares and distributed to the 
welfare recipients based on their share ownership). 
Given the interest of public corporations in enhancing their 
wealth and profitability, corporate fiduciaries and counsel may 
not, consistent with their fiduciary duties, simply ignore the 
binary arguments that indicate that broadening corporate share 
 
Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1539. The importance of widespread ownership to 
democracy received special attention in KELSO & KELSO, supra note 2. Many binary 
economists believe that the vast majority of people are denied equal protection 
because they are substantially excluded from government-provided legal protections 
by which capital markets function to enable well-capitalized people to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital. See Ashford, The Promise of Universal 
Capitalism, supra note 2, at 99–101; Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, at 1571–73. 
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ownership will achieve these objectives.  Rather, due diligence 
requires a careful, good faith assessment of the likely effect on 
corporate profitability and corporate wealth that would result 
from encapitalizing employees, consumers, neighbors, and 
welfare recipients by way of binary strategies. 
Of course, not all shareholders would favor a binary policy of 
encapitalizing corporate employees, consumers, neighbors, and 
welfare recipients even if that policy would enhance corporate 
profitability and wealth.  Like other monopolists, those who are 
members of a group that together enjoy an effective monopoly on 
capital acquisition with the earnings of capital may prefer slower 
growth, provided they acquire it all, to greater growth if it must 
be shared with others.  Some existing shareholders may prefer to 
own a larger portion of a smaller, less profitable corporation than 
a smaller portion of a larger, more profitable corporation even if 
in material terms they would be better off with the smaller 
portion of the larger, more profitable corporation.  But there is no 
reason to assume that all shareholders would be so stingy.  Many 
shareholders might prefer the binary ownership alternative if 
they were presented with and understood the arguments 
supporting it.  If the binary approach to capital acquisition would 
benefit the corporation, at least shareholders should be presented 
the arguments supporting it and given the choice.  Directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation to present profitable corporate 
opportunities to all the shareholders even if some would oppose 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
Binary economics offers an opportunity beyond mainstream 
thinking for helping the vast majority of women and people of 
color.  It provides important insights regarding the persistence of 
widespread unmet needs and desires of billions of people 
alongside the unutilized productive capacity to meet more fully 
those needs and desires.  It also reveals opportunities for 
achieving enhanced corporate profitability and growth and more 
broadly shared economic prosperity by way of voluntary, 
ownership-broadening market transactions. 
According to binary theory, the right to acquire capital with 
the earnings can be extended to growing numbers, and 
eventually to all people, without redistribution.  This inclusive, 
enriching approach to corporate finance can be achieved with 
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only modest modifications of the existing system, and its 
achievement can be greatly hastened if law teachers and lawyers 
come to see its importance for clients and for economic justice. 
It would better serve the interest of the vast majority of  
most people of color, women, and virtually all people who own 
little or no capital if their attorneys and advisors would include 
the question of unutilized productive capacity and the subject of 
binary economics in their discussions on corporate governance, 
fiduciary duties, and social responsibility. 
In a context in which persistent and growing underutilized 
corporate productive capacity is widely accepted as fact, public 
and private concern for the plight of the economically 
disadvantaged increases.  In such a context, it is not at all clear 
that the substantial corporate wealth-enhancing promise of 
broadening ownership based on binary theory can simply be 
ignored (as it has been in the past) based on the authority of 
mainstream economic theories.  These theories have failed to 
explain or remedy the persistent and growing phenomenon of 
unutilized productive capacity of public corporations. 
Some people start with the premise that proponents of the 
binary approach to corporate finance have a burden of proving 
that their proposed reforms have sufficient merit to be 
implemented.  But fiduciaries must start with the recognition 
that they have an independent, affirmative duty of 
investigation37—a duty to consider and explore wealth 
maximizing opportunities even if the reformers’ burden of proof 
has not been met to the satisfaction of economists. 
In support of the inclusion of binary economics in the 
discussion of corporate governance, fiduciary duties, and social 
responsibility, when judged under the scientific criteria of (1) 
reasonable assumptions, (2) internal consistency, and (3) 
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive power, the binary 
approach fares at least as well if not better than the classical, 
neoclassical, and Keynesian economic approaches to unutilized 
productive capacity and growth, which are explicitly or implicitly 
relied upon by clients and counsel in the discussion of those 
topics. 
Many counsel for people of color, women, and the 
 
37 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
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economically disadvantaged (who have undertaken to represent 
such people regarding their economic interests) frequently 
advance labor rights, welfare rights, compensation rights, and 
other corporate policies to address inequities and hardships 
suffered by their clients.  The same is true for many legal 
advocacy organizations, foundations, and government agencies 
that have as their objective or mandate advocacy and direct 
action (1) on behalf of such people and (2) regarding the 
improvement of legislation and economic policy so as to enhance 
the economic well-being of such people.  But very few such 
attorneys, organizations, foundations, and agencies advocate the 
binary approach that would secure for their clients or intended 
beneficiaries the right to acquire capital with the earnings of 
capital.38  There is no inherent reason in law to assume such a 
limited notion of the responsibility of advocacy.  The right to 
acquire capital with the earnings of capital is obviously 
important to wealthy clients.  (From a binary historical 
perspective, one might say that a major reason for the Cold War 
was to protect the private right to acquire capital with the 
earnings of capital.)  Then why should that right be excluded by 
attorneys and other advocates who represent the economic 
interests of the economically disadvantaged?  Attorneys who 
represent the economic interests of people of color, women, and 
poor and working people should not limit their advocacy to jobs 
and welfare, and exclude advocacy regarding the right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital, unless their clients consent 
to such limitation and exclusion after consultation.  Valid consent 
requires that the clients are given information reasonably 
sufficient to permit them to appreciate the significance of the 
matter in question.39  Similar ethical considerations should guide 
 
38 A praiseworthy exception is the Center for Economic and Social Justice, 
which has for years championed binary economics. See Center for Economic and 
Social Justice, http://www.cesj.org (last visited Dec. 15, 2005). A book by three of its 
leading members, Norman G. Kurland, Dawn K. Brohawn, and Michael D. Greaney, 
CAPITAL HOMESTEADING FOR EVERY CITIZEN: A JUST FREE MARKET SOLUTION FOR 
SAVING SOCIAL SECURITY (2004), presents proposed legislation along with a detailed 
description of one approach to implementing a binary economy. 
39 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (1983) (“A lawyer may limit 
the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.”). Id. In 
the “Terminology” section of the Model Rules, “Consultation denotes communication 
of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the 
significance of the matter in question.” Thus, it would seem that counsel for poor and 
working people, people of color, and women who have undertaken to advocate for 
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the conduct of other advocates who are not strictly governed by 
attorney rules of professional responsibility. 
Unfortunately, at present, the vast majority of counsel and 
their clients seem wholly unaware that the right to acquire 
capital with the earnings of capital might be the subject of 
advocacy for people of color, women, and poor and working people 
generally.  Although the concepts underlying binary economics 
were first published almost fifty years ago, generations of 
students of law and economics continue to graduate with no 
exposure those concepts.  Reform of the curriculum in law, 
economics, and other disciplines within colleges, universities, 
business schools, and law schools is therefore a matter of urgent 
concern. 
It is true that Louis Kelso, the originator of binary 
economics, was not an economist.  But neither were Adam Smith 
and John Maynard Keynes.  Moreover, although the binary 
approach is most frequently advanced as an economic theory 
(because that is the subject which it most significantly modifies), 
unlike the theories of Smith and Keynes, binary theory is 
grounded in the private property principles of (1) universal 
participation, (2) voluntary exchange, and (3) limitation, all of 
which have deep roots in the work of John Locke and the Anglo-
American common law.40 
Thus, as a matter of long-standing legal principles, binary 
economics offers important insights that women and people of 
color and their attorneys would benefit from understanding.  It 
offers at least one new answer to the two questions that began 
this Article:  What else can public corporations do for women and 
people of color?  What else can attorneys for women and people of 
color do to serve those clients better?  Advocacy of the right to 
acquire capital with the earnings of capital should not be 
excluded by counsel and advocates in their representation of the 
 
their economic interests would need to provide information about binary economics 
and its potential for assisting those clients sufficient to enable them to provide valid 
consent to limit the representation so as to exclude advocacy regarding their rights 
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital. 
40 It is significant to note that the following private property principles are also 
necessary conditions for a competitive market: (1) no barriers to entry, (2) voluntary 
exchange, and (3) limitations to prevent monopolistic practices. See ASHFORD & 
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, at 336–38; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 2, at 23–29; 
Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 
supra note 2, at 1569. 
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economic interests of women and people of color without their 
clients’ informed consent. 
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APPENDIX:  BINARY ECONOMICS AND TWELVE QUESTIONS FOR 
COUNSEL TO WOMEN AND PEOPLE OF COLOR 
Often, serving clients well requires that counsel ask the 
right question.  The following are twelve questions that counsel 
for the economically disadvantaged rarely ask. 
 
(1)  Why does wealth tend to concentrate in market 
economies even in times of great prosperity? 
(2)  Why, if markets are basically free and competitive, does 
vast excess productive capacity persist alongside of widespread 
unmet needs and wants? 
(3)  Why does the great promise of the industrial revolution 
(abundance and leisure) remain unfulfilled for most people? 
(4)  Why does every generation of students graduate deeper 
in debt? 
(5)  Does it matter whether the ownership of capital is highly 
concentrated or broadly distributed among people? 
(6)  What is behind the adage, “It takes money to make 
money”? 
(7)  What are the growth and distributive consequences of 
the fact that most capital is acquired with the earnings of 
capital? 
(8)  How can more economic opportunity become more 
broadly distributed? 
(9)  Is there a practical, efficient way to enable all people to 
acquire capital with the earnings of capital without taking 
anything from existing owners? 
(10)  Will an opening of the capital markets produce 
substantial distribution-based economic growth? 
(11)  How can the need for increased economic growth to 
benefit poor and working people be harmonized with 
environmental necessities? 
(12)  What is the relationship between the distribution of 
ownership and the functioning of a democracy? 
 
Binary economics offers important new insights, answers, 
and solutions. 
 
